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INTRODUCTION
In 2002, twenty-year-old Evance Moyo was convicted of murder
and sentenced “at the pleasure of the President” in the High Court of
Malawi for a crime he committed in 1997 while he was sixteen years
old.1 While attending a party, Moyo stabbed and killed Moses
Chibwana during a fight involving friends from both sides.2 Moyo
was arrested and remanded at Chichiri Maximum Prison alongside
adults wherein he remained incarcerated following his conviction in
a 2002 trial.3 Under Section 26(2) of the Penal Code (Cap 7:01) and
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1. Moyo v. Att’y Gen. (2007) Cons. Case No. 12 (Malawi).
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id.
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Section 11(1) of the then Children and Young Persons Act of 1969
(Cap 26:03) of the Laws of Malawi, children convicted of homicide
were sentenced “during the President’s pleasure.”4 The trial judge
ordered that Moyo be sent to an approved school,5 but he was
nonetheless sent to Chichiri prison where he remained alongside
adult prisoners.
With the help of human rights organizations, Moyo applied to the
Constitutional Court for a determination that his constitutional rights
as a child “to treatment consistent with the special needs of children”
and to “be imprisoned only as a last resort and for the shortest period
of time” had been violated by keeping him on remand in an adult
prison from 1997 to 2002 while still a juvenile and incarcerated for
nearly eleven years.6 Among other things, Moyo sought to declare
sentences “at the pleasure of the President” unconstitutional based on
the fact that sentencing is an integral part of a trial and cannot be
independent if the President dictates the sentence. In its judgment,
the Court focused on whether a sentence “at the pleasure of the
President” constitutes a mandatory life sentence and concluded that it
did not, but “rather can be equated to an indeterminate sentence
which cannot be held to be unconstitutional.”7 Despite
acknowledging that Moyo’s remand and incarceration in adult prison
for years was in blatant disregard of his welfare, his special needs as
a juvenile, and his best interests, the court refused to make an order
for compensation, saying the incarceration was a function of poor
implementation of the court’s judgment.8 Such is the plight of
children who find themselves in conflict with the law.
Among the many protections in the Convention on the Rights of
4. Id. at 7.
5. At the approved school, a “board of visitors” would have assessed his
progress and rehabilitation so as to make an informed decision about when he
should be released. Id. at 7-8.
6. See id. at 2 (explaining that the Court must consider whether Moyo’s
incarceration was a violation of Section 42(2)(g)(iii) of the Constitution, Article 3
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Section 31 of the Children and
Young Persons Act).
7. Id. at 8.
8. See id. at 8 (determining that the system ignored its statutory duty because
when a court sentences a juvenile to be held at the pleasure of the President, the
law mandates that the juvenile’s case be reviewed so that he can be released at any
stage depending on the recommendation made to the President, which did not
occur in Moyo’s case).
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the Child (“CRC” or “Convention”)9, those pertaining to justice for
children seem to be the most curtailed worldwide, despite effort in
the international arena to develop safeguards in the field of child
justice.10 Nonetheless, it is evident that things are changing for the
better in most places. The 1969 Act under which Moyo was
sentenced has since been replaced by the Child Care, Protection and
Justice Act,11 which does not bear any provision of sentencing
children at the pleasure of the President. Even though this sentence
still exists under the Penal Code, it is evident that the new Act
provides more protection for children.12 This as well as other
safeguards developing for children in Malawi and other nations bear
testimony to the fact that children’s rights have become an accepted
phenomenon, even where children are in conflict with the law.
However, as observed by the Africa Child Policy Forum (“ACPF”),
“while there has been progress in developing appropriate measures
for children, there are still significant gaps in dealing with children in
the criminal justice system.”13 The United Nations (“UN”) has said
that there need not be “a duality between human rights and juvenile
justice,”14 and that restorative justice is the best way to deal with
children in conflict with the law in a manner that ably respects
children’s rights as well as promotes justice in society. This is
9. See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 3, opened for
signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990)
[hereinafter CRC] (identifying the rights of children and mandating that states
parties implement them).
10. Odongo Godfrey Odhiambo, The Domestication of International Law
Standards on the Rights of the Child with Specific Reference to Juvenile Justice in
the African Context 7 (Oct. 18, 2005) (unpublished L.L.D. thesis, University of the
Western Cape), available at http://etd.uwc.ac.za/usrfiles/modules/etd/docs/
etd_init_9110_1176963955.pdf.
11. See Malawi Parliament Passes Child Care, Protection and Justice Bill,
NETNEWSPUBLISHER (June 29, 2010), http://www.netnewspublisher.com/malawiparliament-passes-child-care-protection-and-justice-bill/ (explaining that the bill
seeks to improve problems of child trafficking and abduction, as well as recognize
principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child).
12. Child Care, Protection, and Justice Act No. 22 of 2010 (Malawi).
13. AFR. CHILD POLICY FORUM, REALISING RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN:
HARMONISATION OF LAWS ON CHILDREN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN ASIA 6 (2007),
available at http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0002744/ACPF_children_rights
.pdf.
14. GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE: A
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICE, at 8, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA.SER.M/49-50, U.N. Sales No. E.99.IV.7 (1999).
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evidenced by the jurisprudential developments in the international
framework for child justice which, while recognizing that “mankind
owes to the child, the best it has to give,”15 has culminated into the
principle of “the best interests of the child.”16 Regarding the purpose
of child justice, the philosophy has moved from merely reclaiming
the delinquent child to restoring children in conflict with the law.17
The difference being that “reclaiming,” meaning “retrieve,”
“recover,” or “repossess,” is more limited than “restoring,” which
has elements of reinstating, re-establishment and repair.18
Why then has the idea of human rights for children been important
in the field of child justice? A report of one of the general
discussions of the Committee on the Rights of the Child
acknowledges that “the police officer or judge who took the decision
to keep a youth in prison instead of returning him immediately to his
parents assumed a heavy responsibility and the direction of an entire
life might depend on a decision that was usually taken a few hours
after the youth had been stopped in the street.”19 This explains the
need to “minimize the contact of children with the criminal justice
system at all levels and this necessitates the importance of the
traditional justice system in improving the situation of children in
conflict with the law.”20 The fresh influence of restorative justice has
arguably been most effective in the arena of child justice.21 It is
15. Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child ¶ 3, Sept. 26, 1924,
[hereinafter Declaration of the Rights of the Child] available at http://www.undocuments.net/gdrc1924.htm.
16. CRC, supra note 9, at art. 3.
17. See U.N. Human Rights Council [UNHRC], Human Rights in the
Administration of Justice, in Particular
Juvenile Justice, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/L.15 (Mar. 20, 2009) (calling upon
states to prevent and address juvenile delinquency using inter alia restorative
justice).
18. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1896, 1936 (3d ed. 1993).
19. U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child [C.R.C.], 10th Sess., 254th mtg.
¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR.254 (Nov. 17, 1995).
20. Id. at ¶ 11.
21. See UNICEF Welcomes Signing of Child Justice Bill into Law, UNICEF
(May 18, 2009), http://www.unicef.org/media/media_49695.html (explaining that
restorative justice is more effective than “retributive” approaches because
restorative justice encourages the child offender, the victim, the families, and the
community to work together to repair harm done and prevent further criminal acts,
rather than focusing solely on punishment); cf. Ann Skelton, For the Next
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recommended that states “adopt and encourage restorative justice
and rehabilitation schemes for child offenders, focusing on diversion
from the criminal justice system at all stages.”22 On the outset, let it
be explained that while the terminologies of “juvenile justice” and
“youth justice” have been the dominant terms in most places,
especially in the West, the current trend, especially in Africa, is to
use the term “child justice.”23 “Child justice” is the preferred term in
this paper, although both terms will be used interchangeably when
necessary, especially when referring to international documents and
jurisdictions that use the term “juvenile” or “youth.”
The UN has highlighted the seriousness of the problem of juvenile
delinquency and youth crime in a number of its Congress meetings.24
Child-perpetrated crimes have been on the rise.25 Child offenders are
dealt with in a wide range of ways from place to place.26 Also, there
are major practical and theoretical differences between systems and
countries regarding the minimum age of criminal responsibility,27
depending on how a particular society views the developmental

Generations: Remaking South Africa’s Juvenile Justice System, in TO REPAIR THE
IRREPARABLE: REPARATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 211, 215
(Erik Doxtader & Charles Villa-Vicencio eds., 2004) (contrasting the Western
world’s tough restorative justice approach to criminal behavior with the restorative
justice model that was used in pre-colonial South Africa and to which South Africa
is arguably returning; the restorative justice model emphasizes reconciliation,
restitution, healing, and harmony).
22. AFR. CHILD POLICY FORUM, supra note 13, at 10.
23. For example, the United States uses the term “juvenile” while Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand mainly use the term “youth justice.”
24. For example, the 8th and 9th U.N. National Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1990 and 1995, respectively.
25. See Anthony L. Pillay, Criminal Capacity in Children Accused of Murder:
Challenges in the Forensic Mental Health Assessment, 18 J. CHILD. &
ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH 17, 17 (2006) (discussing children’s perpetration
of violent crimes, particularly murder, and the role and challenges of forensic
mental health assessments of children accused of murder).
26. See John A. Winterdyk, Introduction, in JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES vii, xi (John A. Winterdyk ed., 1997) (comparing
juvenile justice models between ten countries by analyzing differences in general
features, key personnel and agencies, tasks, understanding of client behavior,
purpose of intervention, and objectives and categorizing the countries on a
continuum from “participatory” to “crime control”).
27. See id. at viii (contrasting the age at which children can be found guilty of
an offense and the justification of each approach in the United Kingdom, the
United States, and South Africa).
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capacity of children to understand the societal prescripts of right and
wrong and to act in accordance with that appreciation.28 The
Committee on the Rights of the Child reiterates the indivisibility of
rights, holistic implementation, and the concept of partnership and
cooperation in realizing rights.29 “Political organization and systems
of governance, as well as the social organization and economic
situation of countries, have a bearing on their capacity and efforts to
fulfill treaty obligations and realize the human rights of children”.30
All these issues and more justify the need for a standardized way of
dealing with children who find themselves in conflict with the law
where the development of children’s rights and an international
framework for child justice has been a key factor.
When it comes to justice for children, there have been several
shifts in the policy approaches since the nineteenth century. The
child justice system internationally has developed from an initial
welfarist approach, to a justice model, then to a rights-based
approach, and now there is a shift towards a restorative model. The
welfarist approach mainly operated until around the 1960s and it was
based on the doctrine of parens patriae, considering the state as a
“kind and just parent.”31 The “justice” model32 was based on a law
and order agenda.33 Following this, perceptions of justice for children
28. See Pillay, supra note 25, at 18 (stating that the various definitions of
“juvenile” or “young offender” are often influenced by “cultural, historical,
political and social differences”).
29. See generally C.R.C., General Measures of Implementation for the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5 (Nov. 27,
2003) [hereinafter C.R.C., General Measures of Implementation] (assessing states
parties’ measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and recommending approaches to further successful implementation of the
Convention).
30. See Savitri Goonesekere, Law Reform and Children’s Rights in Plural
Legal Systems: Some Experiences in Sub-Saharan Africa, in PROTECTING THE
WORLD’S CHILDREN: IMPACT OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
IN DIVERSE LEGAL SYSTEMS 209, 214 (UNICEF 2007) (exploring the CRC’s
unique feature that places obligations not only on states and their agencies, but also
on non-state actors, and examining how political instability, internal conflict, and
violence have affected children’s lives in Benin, Ghana, and Zimbabwe).
31. Ann Skelton, The Influence of the Theory and Practice of Restorative
Justice in South Africa with Special Reference to Child Justice 260 (2005)
(unpublished L.L.D. thesis, University of Pretoria) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Skelton Thesis].
32. Id. at 256.
33. Allison Morris & Henri Giller, Conclusion, in PROVIDING CRIMINAL
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took a rights-based approach where competing interests were
presented in terms of the cultural understanding of children as
objects of rights and the modern understanding of children as
subjects of rights. At the moment, most child justice jurisdictions are
shifting to restorative justice, which among other things aims at
involving the victim, the offender, and the community in dealing
with crime, and strives for the reparation of harm and reintegration of
the offender into society. Restorative justice is described as “a
buzzword in progressive criminal justice reform throughout the
world.”34 It is generally defined as “a process whereby all parties
with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve
collectively how to deal with the aftermath of an offence and its
implications for the future.”35 In a context where the public is
expecting the criminal justice system to provide a remedy, restorative
justice as an approach involves “giving communities a greater stake
in justice.”36

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO CHILD
JUSTICE
Sociologist Ellen Key predicted that the twentieth century would
be a century of the child.37 The idea of rights for children accused of
committing offenses, and of treating them differently from adults,
has philosophical underpinnings, the origins of which can be traced
to the welfare model and the justice model.38 Initially, a welfarist
JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN 151, 153 (Morris & Giller eds., 1983).
34. Ann Skelton, Restorative Justice in Child Systems in Africa, in CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS IN AFRICA: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 129 (Julia Sloth-Nielsen ed., 2008).
35. Tony F. Marshall, The Evolution of Restorative Justice in Britain, 4 EUR. J.
ON CRIM. POL’Y & RES. 22, 37 (1996).
36. See Ann Skelton, Setting Standards for Diversion, CHILD AND YOUTH
CARE WORKERS ONLINE (June, 2001), http://www.cyc-net.org/cyc-online/cycol0601-skelton.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2011) (explaining that communities are
more likely to take responsibiltiy and play an active role in raising children if they
are given the opportunity to participate in justice outcomes).
37. Ann Skelton, Restorative Justice as a Unifying Force for Child Justice
Theory and Practice, UNICEF http://www.unicef.org/tdad/4annskelton.pdf (last
visited July 21, 2011); see also ELLEN KEY, THE CENTURY OF THE CHILD 7 (1909),
available
at
http://ia700308.us.archive.org/11/items/centuryofchild00keyeuoft/centuryofchild0
0keyeuoft.pdf.
38. Odhiambo, supra note 10.
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approach was employed, as initiated by the United States, until the
1960s when there was a shift towards a justice oriented model.39 The
debate on these theories concentrates on western criminal law
systems.40 Before the 18th century, childhood was not recognized as
having special status at common law and age did not generally afford
any special protection where children were charged with the
commission of criminal offences. Children were theoretically subject
to the same procedures and penalties as adults and little attempt was
made to separate them from adults during incarceration.41 In 1835,
the House of Lords Committee on Goals and Houses of Correction
recommended the segregation of adult and child offenders, leading to
the passing of the Parkhurst Act of 1838 and the setting up of a
separate penitentiary for young offenders.42 Following this, reformist
activity for separate institutions for children flourished such that at
the end of the nineteenth century the first juvenile courts were
established and institutions for young offenders were established as
an alternative to deportation or imprisonment.43 These reforms were
initiated by “child savers,” two of which introduced the first juvenile
court in the world, namely Lucy Flower and Julia Lathrop.44
There was an emerging idea that children should be treated

39. Skelton Thesis, supra note 31, at 256.
40. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 5.
41. See Julia Sloth-Nielsen, Juvenile Justice 51-52 (2001) (unpublished L.L.D.
thesis, University of the Western Cape), available at http://www.slothnielsen.com/images/stories/uploader/juliathesisChapter_1.doc (explaining that
although childhood was considered a mitigating factor during sentencing, children
could be jailed with adults, flogged, and even executed as recently as the
nineteenth century).
42. GILES PLAYFAIR, THE PUNITIVE OBSESSION: AN UNVARNISHED HISTORY
OF THE ENGLISH PRISON SYSTEM 152 (1971).
43. See generally ALLISON MORRIS & HENRI GILLER, UNDERSTANDING
JUVENILE JUSTICE (1987); ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 9-10 (1969); DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE
JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 3-22 (2004).
44. Ann Skelton, Restorative Justice as a Unifying Force for Child Justice
Theory and Practice, UNICEF http://www.unicef.org/tdad/4annskelton.pdf (last
visited July 21, 2011). The court was first manned by two women, Jane Adams and
Florence Kelley. One of the first probation officers at the court was also a woman:
Ida Barnett Wells. Its first woman judge, Mary Bartelme, adjudicated girls’ cases
from 1913 and was appointed as the presiding judge for the Chicago Juvenile
Court in the 1920s. Bernardine Dohrn, All Ellas: Girls Locked Up, 30 FEMINIST
STUD. 302, 302 (2004).
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differently due to their youth.45 Under the principle of parens
patriae, parental control was substituted by state control, the
rationale being that the state would act in the child’s best interests
and would thereby enhance the child’s welfare.46 In 1891, a
probation system was developed in Massachusetts in which criminal
courts were required to appoint probation officers in cases involving
children.47 In 1899, the Illinois Juvenile Court Act was embodied
with the theme that neglected, dependent, and delinquent children
should all be dealt with in a separate children’s court.48 A juvenile
court was thus established and with the inception of the court, “a
sympathetic judge could now use his discretion to apply
individualized treatments to rehabilitate children, instead of
punishing them.”49 According to Zimring, the juvenile court system
was the “most successful of American legal innovations.”50 The
juvenile court’s reaction to the problem of delinquency was viewed
not as “punishment” but as “treatment,” and an expert juvenile court
judge, social service personnel, clinicians and probation officers
would all work together to find a treatment plan suitable for a
particular child’s needs.51 The “rehabilitative ideal” thus required that
the juvenile court look at the social and economic background of
every child it was dealing with.52 As Odhiambo says, “the juvenile
court would involve itself with the issue of ‘what had to be done in

45. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 24 (citing Deborah L. Mills, United States v.
Johnson: Acknowledging the Shift in the Juvenile Court System From
Rehabilitation to Punishment, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 903, 904-05 (1996)).
46. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 25.
47. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early
Twentieth Century, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 47 (Margaret K.
Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile
Courts].
48. Skelton Thesis, supra note 31, at 259.
49. See Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts, supra note 47, at 42
(describing the juvenile court in Illinois, which lacked many important features
added later, including private hearings, confidential records, the complaint system,
detention homes, and probation officers).
50. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE xi (2005) (noting
that the American model for the juvenile court is used as the basis for juvenile
courts in legal systems throughout the world).
51. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 22.
52. CLAIRE BREEN, THE STANDARD OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: A
WESTERN TRADTION IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 195 (2002).
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the child’s interests’ and not that of guilt in a strict sense.”53 As
summed up by Feld, the juvenile court, by virtue of the doctrine of
parens patriae, placed emphasis on treatment, supervision and
control rather than on punishment and allowed the state to intervene
affirmatively in the lives of more young offenders.54 Reformatories
and industrial schools were founded to which children could be
referred.55 Early reformers stressed the responsibility of the state
towards its children and although this has been criticized for overreliance on institutionalization, Feld describes the reforms as
important because they insisted on the separation of child and adult
offenders and also recognized the interconnectedness of delinquency
and neglect.56
With a focus on looking at children as immature because of their
age, welfarism did not regard children as rational or self-determining
agents.57 Such a view was also based on the moral intellectual
development theory in criminology, which suggests that the younger
the actor, the less probable their behavior is to always be informed
by a sense of right and wrong.58 However, under the welfare system,
children were not allowed the due process safeguards of the law.59
For example, children were not accorded procedural safeguards like
legal representation and rules of evidence.60 The system was full of
protectionist policies and this, coupled with extensive reliance on the
use of institutionalization often for indeterminate periods of time, led
to a lot of criticism of welfarism.61 Despite its rehabilitative agenda,
53. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 24.
54. BREEN, supra note 52, at 198 (citing Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court
Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver
Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 475 (1987)).
55. Ann Skelton, From Cook County to Pretoria: A Long Walk to Justice for
Children, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 413, 413 (2011) [hereinafter Skelton, From
Cook County to Pretoria] (stating that sixty-four reformatories were created by
1867 in Scotland, England, and Wales).
56 . Id. at 413.
57. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 24.
58. Id. at 25.
59. Id. at 26.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding that a child’s due
process rights, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, and
protections under the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution were violated
when he was sentenced to a maximum of six years in a state industrial school after
an informal hearing in which no witnesses participated, the child did not have
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there was a violation of rights and the potential for discriminatory
treatment in the welfare system.62 As a result, the justice model
developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.63
The justice approach adopted a law and order agenda. Punishment,
and not “treatment of offenders” was its principal ideal.64 Children
were no longer to be regarded as immature, but as rational or selfdetermining.65 Such a conceptualization of children mainly took
ground after the celebrated 1967 decision of the U.S Supreme Court
in In Re Gault, wherein it was declared that juveniles have a right to
counsel and other due process rights because, “under the
Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo
court.”66 Prior to In Re Gault, a juvenile delinquency proceeding was
not considered a criminal proceeding and children did not need an
attorney “because juvenile justice was intended to reform or
rehabilitate a child rather than to punish,” despite the fact that “a
child’s liberty is at just as much risk in a delinquency proceeding as
an adult would be in a criminal proceeding.”67 The court eventually
acknowledged that “departures from established principles of due
process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but
arbitrariness. . . .”68
In general, “the welfare model can be
understood as one polarity on a theoretical continuum of possible
models of regimes of juvenile justice.”69
access to counsel, and the judge relied mostly on hearsay statements made by a
probation officer).
62. See Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 28 (citing Nicholas Bala & Rebecca
Jaremko Bromwich, Introduction: An International Perspective on Youth Justice,
in JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS 1, 7 (Nicholas Bala et al. eds., 2002) (describing
informal proceedings that violated the presumption of innocence and the right to
counsel)).
63. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 29.
64. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 29.
65. Id.
66. Gault, 387 U.S. at 28 (Fortas, J.).
67. Stephen S. Schofield, 40 Years After Gault, Still Searching for True Justice
(May 21, 2007) (unpublished term paper) (on file with The Juvenile Justice
Foundation), available at http://janetsisk.forumup.org/about821-janetsisk.html.
68. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-19.
69. See Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 34. See generally Thomas Crofts, The
Rise of the Principle of Education in the German Juvenile System, 12 INT’L J.
CHILD. RTS. 401, 401 (2004) (noting that the justice model is based on “individual
responsibility” and focuses on punishing criminal acts while the welfare model
focuses on intervention and the behaviors behind criminal acts).
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As a rights culture developed in various countries, there was reorientation on the philosophical basis for child justice, hence the
development of a justice model as an alternative discourse.70 This
discourse did not regard child delinquents as victims of the
environment in which they lived, and it gave priority to the liberty
and agency of its individual citizens, which included children.71 In
that regard, the justice model regarded children as “reasoning agents
who are fully responsible for their actions and should be held
accountable before the law.”72 As such, juvenile justice would
therefore work to assess the degree of culpability of the individual
child offender and apportion punishment in proportion to the offense,
while according the full rights to due process to the individual child
as per Gault, thereby restraining the power of the state.73 Priority was
given to suppression and deterrence of policies, and this was
strengthened by the just deserts emphasis that gave academic
legitimacy to punishment. 74 In line with the “just deserts”
philosophy, child justice entails the balancing of the need to protect
society against criminal behavior on the one hand and the need to
pay special attention to the personal circumstances of the child
offender on the other hand.75 Bearing in mind the free will endowed
on each individual, the focus is not on how to protect the best
interests of the child but on retribution as the primary goal of justice
for purposes of ensuring the protection of society.76 In summation,
under the welfare model, the state, as parens patriae, was
responsible for the “immature” and “innocent” child, whose best
interest had to be protected, whereas under the justice model, the
capacity of the child to commit crime and thus bear the consequences
of his actions was affirmed.77
The principle set forth in Gault offers only limited procedural
safeguards to delinquent youth.78 The main criticism of the juvenile
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 29.
Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 30.
Id.
GORDON BAZEMORE & MARA SCHIFF, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM AND
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 9 (2005).
75. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 31.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 33 (citing BARRY KRISBERG, JUVENILE
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court was that it still reflected some elements of parens patriae, and
so it did not totally mirror its regular or adult counterpart in that it
failed to fully extend the applicable due process rights to criminal
trials of juveniles, thereby limiting the range of procedural rights to
which children were entitled and subjecting them to “the worst of
both worlds” in the process.79 As a result, in the late 1980s, diversion
of child offenders became common as an alternative to incarceration
in many western jurisdictions.80
Singer says that “it is difficult to gauge the needs of juveniles
within a criminal justice system because that system is geared
towards adult offenders.”81 He continues to say that the stated intent
of juvenile justice was never just to provide a second chance but also
to provide rehabilitative treatment, which refers to a system of
dealing with the emotional, psychological, or sociological factors
that lead individuals to commit serious acts of violence.82 According
to Singer, a rehabilitative-treatment ideology makes sense in a
system of juvenile justice where something is done to deal with
whatever troubled behavior led to an act of delinquency or crime.83
At the heart of the justice model is the United States of America,
which, together with Somalia, has not ratified the CRC.84 As Skelton
JUSTICE: REDEEMING OUR CHILDREN 57 (2005)).
79. Id.
80. This led to views of corporatism as a third model of juvenile justice, which
did not gain much significance as a theory. See John Pratt, Corporatism: The Third
Model of Juvenile Justice, 29 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 236, 245 (1989) (identifying a
new model of juvenile justice found in advanced welfare societies in which “the
capacity for conflict and disruption is reduced by centralization of policy,
increased government intervention, and the co-operation of various professional
and interest groups”).
81. See Simon I. Singer, Youthful Offender Status and the Reproduction of
Juvenile Justice Within Systems of Criminal Justice: The Case of William
Shrubsall, 17 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 107, 116 (1999) (arguing that a seventeen-yearold who murdered his mother and was initially identified as a criminal, but was
later given a youthful offender status without any rehabilitation or treatment,
returned to violent crimes later in life because of the failure to address the
underlying causes of his crime).
82. Id. at 108.
83. Id. at 118-19.
84. The United States and Somalia signed the treaty in 1995 and 2002
respectively. Among other things, the United States’s reasoning for not ratifying
the treaty is based on “right-wing” concerns bordering on fears that the CRC’s
provisions potentially disempower parents in the upbringing of their children and

556

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[27:3

says, the most concerning feature of the law and order agenda for
children in the United States’ criminal justice system has been the
tendency to include increasing numbers of children in the adult
criminal justice system, referred to as a “waiver,” of the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court.85 As a result, there has been a radical shift from
a focus on the “needs” of the child to the “deeds” of the child,
because the system is offense-driven,86 thereby ignoring the
differences in development, maturity, capacity, and culpability
between children and adults.87 In trying children as adults, children
are subject to minimum sentences which places the American
criminal justice system at odds with international standards.88 A case
in point is that of State v. Pittman where a thirty year sentence, the
minimum sentence for murder in South Carolina, was given to
Pittman, who was twelve-years-old when he committed murder.89
Although Pittman’s convictions were vacated on July 27, 2010 when
the Court of Common Pleas for the Sixth Judicial Circuit90 granted
Pittman post-conviction relief based on the fact that his Counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to pursue a plea agreement
where Pittman could have pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and
potentially received a lighter sentence,91 the system of trying children
undermine the family. Susan Kilbourne, U.S. Failure to Ratify the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child: Playing Politics with Children’s Rights, 6
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 437, 438-41 (1996).
85. Skelton Thesis, supra note 31.
86. See generally PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN
CRIMINAL COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS 17 (1998)
(describing the conditions for waiver, including mandatory waiver in some states
or statutory exclusion from juvenile court jurisdiction for certain offenses and
under specified conditions).
87. See Barry C. Feld, Rehabilitation, Retribution and Restorative Justice:
Alternative Conceptions of Juvenile Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR
JUVENILES: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 17, 32 (G. Bazemore & L.
Walgrave eds., 1999) (arguing that the developmental and psychological
differences between children and adults affects children’s ability to make sound
judgments).
88. Johan D. Van der Vyver, International Standards for the Promotion and
Protection of Children’s Rights: American and South African Dimensions, 15
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 81, 84 (2009).
89. State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 151-53 (S.C. 2007).
90. Pittman v. South Carolina, No. 07-CP-12-00444, at 40 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl.
6th Jud. Cir. Aug. 4, 2010) (order granting applicant’s petition for post-conviction
relief).
91. Id. at 40.
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as adults and subjecting them to minimum sentences still stands.92 In
other jurisdictions, the law is more progressive in terms of minimum
sentences for children. For example, in South Africa, the
Constitutional Court has held in the case of S v. B that “the minimum
sentencing regime limits the discretion of sentencing officers by
orienting them away from non-custodial options, by interfering with
the individualization of sentences, and by giving rise to longer prison
sentences.”93 The court, however, stated that the traditional aims of
punishment for child offenders have to be re-appraised in the light of
international instruments.94 However, following this decision, the
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act 38 of 2007 was passed,
reinstating minimum sentences for sixteen and seventeen-year-olds.
This was challenged by the Centre for Child Law and, the case
having gone through the High Court95 and the Constitutional Court, 96
the Criminal Law Amendment Act (as amended) was declared to be
invalid to the extent that it included sixteen and seventeen-year-olds.
Justice Cameron reasoned that “the Constitution draws this sharp
distinction between children and adults not out of sentimental
considerations, but for practical reasons relating to children’s greater
physical and psychological vulnerability.”97 This vulnerability
therefore merits consideration when handling children in the justice
system. Thus, minimum sentences are not applicable to children
below the age of eighteen in South Africa.
Perhaps, the difficulty with the United States is that it has a limited
acceptance of children’s rights, having not ratified the CRC. As such,
it is not easy to see child offenders through the prism of international
human rights for children. However, positive changes are taking
place in the child justice system of the United States. Having
abolished capital punishment for children (under eighteen years of
age) in 2005 in the popular case of Roper v. Simmons,98 the Supreme
92. See GRIFFIN, supra note 86, at 1 (stating that all states allow the criminal
prosecution of juveniles as adults under certain circumstances).
93. Skelton, From Cook County to Pretoria, supra note 55, at 424.
94. Brandt v. State 2004 (513/2003) SA 1 (SCA) at ¶ 13-15 (S. Afr.).
95. Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Others 2008 JOL 22687 (T)
(S. Afr.).
96. Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development
and Others 2009 (2) SACR 477 CC (S. Afr.).
97. Id. ¶ 26.
98. 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).
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Court has recently abolished life sentences for children without the
possibility of parole for non-homicide cases as impermissible under
the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause in
Graham v. Florida.99 The court had recourse to the judgments of
other nations and the international community and considered the
absence of such sentences in other countries, the United States being
the only nation that imposed this type of sentence.100 Perhaps, this
reference to the international community, which by the way has
ratified the CRC which prohibits life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole and the death penalty for children,101 is evidence
that the United States will soon be ascribing to the international
framework for child justice.

II. THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
CHILD JUSTICE
The General Assembly of the United Nations by its Resolution
44/25 of November 20, 1989, adopted the Convention on the Rights
of the Child102 (“CRC” or the “Convention”), which has come to be
described not only as “a landmark for children and their rights,”103
but also as a “widely acclaimed and almost universally endorsed
Convention.”104 In the words of Michael Freeman, the CRC is a
“landmark in the history of childhood.”105 The CRC “constitutes a
common reference point against which progress can be measured and
results compared.”106 For example, one of its distinctive features is
99. Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, slip op. at 31-32 (U.S. May 17, 2010).
100. Id. at 29, 31. This approach of referring to other countries has been used
before in Eighth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78.
101. CRC, supra note 9, art. 37(a).
102. Id. art. 3.
103. Fact Sheet No. 10, The Rights of the Child, OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR
HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet10Rev.1en.
pdf (last visited July 21, 2011).
104. MICHAEL FREEMAN, THE MORAL STATUS OF CHILDREN: ESSAYS ON THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 2 (1997).
105. Michael Freeman, Introduction: Children as Persons, in CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Michael Freeman ed., 1996) [hereinafter
Freeman, Introduction].
106. Marta Santos Pais, A Vision for Children: The Convention on the Rights of
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that its monitoring and implementation by the Committee on the
Rights of the Child (the “Committee”) gave rise to a new model of
implementation called the General Measures of Implementation.107 It
is said that the CRC constitutes a true challenge for the States
because unlike many other international instruments, besides
requiring legislative amendments and institutional adjustments, it
also requires the adoption of and adjustment to a child rights oriented
philosophy.108 Freeman rightly points out that “it would be wrong to
assume that the CRC is itself the last word on children’s rights.”109
This is evidenced by the adoption of the African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child (“ACRWC” or the “Children’s
Charter”)110 which, as a regional treaty, has been described, in
comparison with others, as a pioneering treaty and “the most
progressive of the treaties on the rights of the child.”111 But how did
this journey start and how has this philosophy been adopted in line
with child justice?
Prior to the CRC’s adoption, the international community adopted
the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice (the “Beijing Rules”),112 which provided a very significant
basis for the development of child justice. Immediately after the
the Child, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FIFTY YEARS AND
BEYOND 131, 132 (Yael Danieli et al. eds., 1999).
107. C.R.C., General Measures of Implementation, supra note 29, ¶ 2. The
general measures are: non-discrimination (Art. 2), respect for the views of the child
(Art. 12), the best interest of the child (Art. 3) and the right to life (Art. 6). Id. at ¶
12.
108. See Making Children’s Rights Work in North Africa: Country Profiles on
Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN RIGHTS
BUREAU (Mar. 2007), http://www.e-joussour.net/en/node/474 (last visited Aug. 4,
2011) (arguing that implementing and following the CRC is a “continuous and
long-term exercise” that is made easier through the sharing of successful measures
and experiences among states with similar circumstances).
109. Freeman, Introduction, supra note 105, at 4.
110. Organization of African Unity [O.A.U.], African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child, 1990, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered into force
Nov. 29, 1999) [hereinafter African Charter].
111. See GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS
OF THE CHILD 402 (1995) (describing the unique features of the Charter, such as its
focus on the rights and duties of individuals and its advanced system of
implementation via an independent committee).
112. See G.A. Res. 40/33, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 96, U.N. Doc
A/RES/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1985) (providing a guide for states to promote juvenile
welfare and minimize the necessity of intervention by the juvenile justice system).
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CRC’s adoption, the UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile
Delinquency (the “Riyadh Guidelines”),113 and the UN Rules for the
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (the “JDL
Rules”),114 were adopted in 1990 thereby enriching the international
justice system for children. In 1997, the UN Economic and Social
Council adopted the UN Guidelines for Action on Children in the
Criminal Justice System.115 Among other things, these rules and
guidelines provide for the circumstances under which children can be
deprived of their liberty and the conditions under which they should
be kept while respecting children’s human rights.116
In 1989, the CRC revolutionized children’s rights, and the area of
child justice was significantly altered.117 Over the centuries, there has
been a clear move from the doctrine of parens patriae which by and
large entrusted parents with rights over their children, and the State
as the ultimate guardian of children.118 In many cases, young people
in the child justice system are generally viewed only in the narrow
perspective as law breakers and a threat to the public.119 However,
children are now a subject of human rights and law rather than an
object of it.120 This has therefore led to the emergence of a rightsbased model of child justice. As is required of Article 40(3) of the
CRC, a “juvenile justice system” requires the institution of separate
laws, procedures, and institutions that apply specifically to children
as opposed to adults.121 “By acknowledging children as bearers of
certain minimum universally agreed standards that have now
crystallized as children’s human rights, the CRC and other
113. See G.A. Res. 45/112, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 68, U.N. Doc
A/RES/4/112 (Dec. 14, 1990) (creating a partnership between young persons and
society by emphasizing socialization, education, and life in the family and the
community to prevent juvenile delinquency).
114. See G.A. Res. 45/113, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 68, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/45/113 (Dec. 14, 1990) (ensuring that juvenile imprisonment only be used
as a last resort, and prescribing standards for the facilities and conditions of
juvenile imprisonment).
115. E.S.C. Res. 1997/97, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1997/97 (Jan. 23, 1997).
116. Id. at 87-88.
117. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 45 (citing VAN BUEREN, supra note 108, at
169).
118. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 3-4.
119. Id. at 8.
120. Id. at 4.
121. CRC, supra note 9, at art. 40(3).
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international norms on the rights of the child stand firmly in the
theoretical justification of any issue regarding the child,” including
child justice.122 Odhiambo argues that “by placing juvenile justice
laws on this continuum, devoid of children’s rights discourse, a
number of violations of children’s rights have been inevitable.”123
Thus, the children’s rights model comes as an “alternative theoretical
basis through which child justice can now be viewed, both in light of
the CRC and other “soft law” derived from child justice
instruments.”124 Olowu also attests to the fact that the adoption of the
CRC, “signaled the beginning of an era of concrete efforts by nations
of the modern world to give legal recognition and protection to the
rights of children, although the subject had been on the international
agenda since shortly after the First World War.”125
When the CRC first came into force, it established a framework
for sweeping changes in the way children’s rights were recognized
across the world.126 The fact that “children’s rights have come full
circle, at least in principle” and “the notion that children have rights
is no longer an issue of debate or contention” is a common
understanding.127 The CRC heralded a critical shift in perspectives on
children, from victims and recipients of welfare to individual rights
holders. 128
There have been a number of Declarations and Resolutions
concerning children’s rights and wellbeing.129 Thus, in the
development of child rights, there have been three significant phases
122. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 5.
123. Id. at 7.
124. Id. at 12.
125. ’Dejo Olowu, Protecting Children’s Rights in Africa: A Critique of the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 10 INT’L J. CHILD RTS.
127, 127 (2002).
126. AFR. CHILD POLICY FORUM, supra note 13, at 4.
127. Id. at 4.
128. WHAT AFRICAN CHILDREN AND YOUTH THINK AND FEEL: AN OPINION
POLL OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 6 (2006),
available
at
http://www.africanchildforum.org/Documents/PollPressConferenceSummary.pdf.
129. See Julia Sloth-Nielsen, Children’s Rights and the Law in African Context:
An Introduction, in CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN AFRICA: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (Julia
Sloth-Nielsen ed., 2008) [hereinafter Sloth-Nielsen, Children’s Rights and the
Law] (referring to those Declarations and Resolutions adopted by the OAU/African
Union).
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from the beginning of the last century to the present,130 starting with
the adoption of the Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child by
the League of Nations in 1924, also known as the beginning of “the
formal establishment of an international movement for children’s
rights.”131 This phase was followed by the adoption of the
Declaration on the Rights of the Child in 1959, and the International
Year of the Child in 1979 to celebrate the Declaration’s twentieth
anniversary.132 Also in 1979, the drafting of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child began, which was finally adopted in 1989 by the
UN General Assembly.133 Now, the development of children’s rights
is in its third phase, where the focus is on implementation,
accountability, and monitoring of the CRC following its
unprecedented and near universal ratification, which demonstrates
the global commitment to the rights of children as a basis for
action.134 “One of the most innovative features of the CRC is the
emphasis on children’s right to participate, to be heard, and to have
their views considered.”135 Following the Beijing Rules,136 the CRC
has now made diversion practices a binding feature of child justice
systems. Diversion, which refers to “the process of channeling
children away from the formal criminal justice systems and can take
place at any stage of the criminal procedure, is now universally seen
130. AFR. CHILD POL’Y FORUM, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD:
HARMONISING LAWS IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 11 (2007), available at
http://www.crin.org/docs/acpf_best_interests.pdf. [hereinafter AFR. CHILD POL’Y
FORUM, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD].
131. ALISON M.S. WATSON, THE CHILD IN POLITICAL ECONOMY: A PLACE AT
THE TABLE 17 (2009).
132. See Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/1386(XIV) (Nov. 20, 1959) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration of the
Rights of the Child]; see also Jesse B. Barber, The International Year of the Child1979, 71 NAT’L MEDICAL ASS’N 427, 427 (1979), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2537253/pdf/jnma00025-0015.pdf.
133. Overview: Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNICEF,
http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/ overview_1583.html (last visited July 21, 2011).
Soon after the CRC’s adoption, there was a World Summit on Children in
September 1990, which had the effect of enhancing a record number of
ratifications of the CRC.
134. See AFR. CHILD POLICY FORUM, supra note 13, at 2; see also Convention
on the Rights of the Child: Frequently Asked Questions, UNICEF (Feb. 10, 2006),
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30229.html (stating that the CRC remains the
most rapidly and widely ratified international human rights treaty).
135. Id. at 7.
136. G.A. Res. 40/33, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1985).
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as an integral aspect of the rehabilitative and reintegrative parts of
each and every child justice system.”137 The idea of having a system
dealing with child offenders can be traced back to the 1924
Declaration which provided that a “delinquent child must be
reclaimed.”138 The 1924 Declaration recognizes that “mankind owes
to the Child the best that it has to give,” and provides five
principles.139 Similarly, the 1959 Declaration reaffirms that “mankind
owes to the child the best it has to give.”140 Principle 2 of the
Declaration states that “the child shall enjoy special protection, and
shall be given opportunities and facilities, by law and by other
means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally,
spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in
conditions of freedom and dignity.”141 “In the enactment of laws for
this purpose, the best interests of the child shall be the paramount
consideration.”142

III.THE REGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR CHILD
JUSTICE IN AFRICA
Member states of the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”)
adopted a Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the African
Child in 1979,143 which recognized the need to take all appropriate
measures to promote and protect the rights and welfare of the
African child. This formed the basis for the African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child (“ACRWC”),144 which was adopted
in 1990 by the Assembly of Heads of State of the then OAU and
which entered into force in 1999.145 Although inspired by trends in
the UN system, the ACRWC prides itself on its “African perspective
137. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 13.
138. Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra note 15, at 2. The
Geneva Declaration was adopted by the League of Nations on September 26, 1924
and only had 5 paragraphs.
139. Id. (highlighting principles of: (1) child development; (2) providing for
hungry, sick, backward, delinquent, and orphan children; (3) relief to distressed
children; (4) earning a livelihood and protection against exploitation; and (5)
service to fellow men).
140. U.N. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra note 132, at pmbl.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Id.
143. African Charter, supra note 110, at pmbl.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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of rights,”146 and rather than replacing the existing standards in the
CRC, it adds to them.147 It was intended to be a complementary
mechanism to that of the UN in order to enhance the enjoyment of
the rights of children in Africa.148 Its conceptualization of the rights
and welfare of the African child takes into consideration the virtues
of the African cultural heritage, historical background, and the values
of the African civilization.149 Such a focus on African children is
important because in many respects, “children are more likely to be
victims of human rights violations than adults, and African children
are more likely to be victims than children on other continents.”150
Causes of human rights violations in Africa, such as poverty,
HIV/AIDS, warfare, famine, and harmful cultural practices have a
disproportionate impact on the continent’s children.151 However,
since the entry into force of the ACRWC, considerable progress has
been made towards making children’s rights visible in a variety of
domains on the continent.152 As a regional treaty, the ACRWC has
been described, in comparison with others, as a pioneering treaty and
“the most progressive of the treaties on the rights of the child.”153
The CRC and the ACRWC are bringing about a paradigm shift in
attitudes and understanding of child rights.154 The challenge is to
translate the provisions in the charters into concrete improvements in
children’s day-to-day lives.155 African states need to ensure that they
move away from seeing the provisions as standards to aspire

146. Sloth-Nielsen, Children’s Rights and the Law, supra note 129, at 3.
147. See Amanda Lloyd, Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child and the African Committee of Experts: Raising the Gauntlet,
10 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 179, 179-80 (2002) (explaining that the African Charter
represents the “’African’ concept of human rights” and can be interpreted
alongside the CRC, which takes a more general and global stance).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 180.
150. Frans Viljoen, The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,
in INTRODUCTION TO CHILD LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 214, 214-15 (C.J. Davel ed.,
2000).
151. Id.
152. Sloth-Nielsen, Children’s Rights and the Law, supra note 129, at 4.
153. VAN BUEREN, supra note 111, at 402.
154. See generally Sloth-Nielsen, Children’s Rights and the Law, supra note
129 (describing briefly the evolution of children’s rights in Africa leading up to the
creation of the ACRWC).
155. Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra note 15, at 7.
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towards, to operational obligations.156
Like the CRC, the ACRWC is a comprehensive instrument that
sets out rights and defines universal principles and norms for the
status of children.157 The ACRWC and the CRC are the only
international and regional human rights treaties that cover the whole
spectrum of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.158
Both the ACRWC and the CRC define a child as a human being
under the age of eighteen,159 although the CRC goes further to say
unless majority is attained earlier under the law applicable to the
child.160 In view of the divergent criminal justice systems in Africa,
having a definitive age for children under the ACRWC is applauded
as commendable.161 It is a second global and first regional binding
instrument that identifies the child as a possessor of certain rights
and makes it possible for the child to assert those rights in domestic
proceedings.162 The Charter therefore adopts a holistic approach to
156. See AFR. CHILD POLICY FORUM, supra note 13, at 7 (noting that there are
few “formalised institutional mechanisms for children’s participation”).
157. Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, The Merits and Demerits of the African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 10 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 157, 157
(2002).
158. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: For Children
and Youth, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/esaro/children_youth_5930.html (last
visited July 10, 2011).
159. African Charter, supra note 110, art. 2; CRC, supra note 9, art. 1.
160. This provision has been criticized as ambiguous and weak and lacking
specific protection within the African context, such as its relation to child
betrothals, child participation in armed conflict and child labor. See Amanda
Lloyd, A Theoretical Analysis of the Reality of Children’s Rights in Africa: An
Introduction to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 2 AFR.
HUM. RTS. L.J. 11, 20 (2002) [hereinafter Lloyd, Theoretical Analysis of the
Reality of Children’s Rights]. Lloyd also explains that the ACRWC has a
“comprehensive, inclusive and progressive provision for general obligations and
responsibilities of state parties” and that it adopts “a modern human rights-centric
approach, bestowing many rights directly on the child by entitlement,” which
highlights the importance of states adhering to the principles and putting them into
effect. See also Amanda Lloyd, The African Regional System for the Protection of
Children’s Rights, in CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN AFRICA: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 33,
35-36 (Julia Sloth-Nielsen ed., 2008) [hereinafter Lloyd, The African Regional
System].
161. Cf. AFR. CHILD POLICY FORUM, supra note 13, at 9 (recommending that
African nations define a child as “any person under the age of eighteen” to bridge
the gap between the CRC and the African Charter and to ensure adequate
protection of children’s rights).
162. Chirwa, supra note 157, at 157.

566

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[27:3

issues relating to the rights and welfare of the child by affirming the
principle that rights are indivisible and interdependent.163 Article 4(1)
of the ACRWC takes a more comprehensive approach to the
protection of children’s rights by making the best interests principle
under the Charter, whereas the CRC regards the principle as “a
primary consideration,” meaning that other considerations are
equally determinant.164 The lower standard in the CRC has been
interpreted as a procedural fairness requirement.165
Children in most African countries constitute fifty percent of the
population,166 and in recent years, there has been a lot of creation of
children’s rights and law across the continent.167 Until recently, most
African juvenile justice systems were modeled on the ideology of the
justice-welfare model as they existed at the time of reception of these
laws.168 In recent years, domestication of children’s rights across the
continent continues to take place at different paces and in varied
fashions. While some states elaborate children’s rights in African
constitutions, others do not.169 Further, some states have enacted
children’s laws either covering both welfare and justice of children in
one statute or separately. For example, the South African
constitutional clause pertaining to children’s rights has been “hailed
as the most extensive constitutional protection for children
anywhere,” while the first comprehensive children’s act on the
continent was adopted in Uganda in 1996.170 According to SlothNielsen, “these endeavours have the aim of reshaping the colonial
heritage, of modernizing and synthesizing child law, and of
domesticating international human rights standards, and of targeting
especially vulnerable groups of children for enhanced protection.”171
163. Id.
164. Lloyd, supra note 147, at 183; Chirwa, supra note 157, at 160.
165. Lloyd, supra note 147, at 183.
166. Sloth-Nielsen, Children’s Rights and the Law, supra note 129, at 6.
167. Id.
168. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 42.
169. Compare THE CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, (Oct. 1, 1991), available
at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/constitution1991.pdf (providing for human
rights generally, without any specific mention of children’s rights) with
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, (Oct. 8, 1995), available at
http://www.ugandaembassy.com/Constitution_of_Uganda.pdf
(providing
for
specific children’s rights as opposed to general human rights).
170. Sloth-Nielsen, Children’s Rights and the Law, supra note 129, at 4-5.
171. Id.
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This protection is as important when the child is in conflict with the
law, as it is when his welfare is in jeopardy. The modernization of
laws in Africa has seen a lot of cross-border fertilization, which has
most extensively been in the field of child justice both from the
programmatic and legislative points of view.172 Successful child
justice reforms have been introduced in many African jurisdictions,
with a “growing continental emphasis on diversion and alternative
programmatic responses to children in conflict with the law,”173
which has seen the incorporation of restorative justice as an
important element of a comprehensive child justice regime.174
In 2000, Steiner and Alston described the African regional human
rights system as “the newest, the least developed or effective. . .the
most distinctive and the most controversial.”175 However, the African
regional system for the protection of children’s rights has been hailed
as the most progressive achievement of all regional systems, as it is
the only system to provide a comprehensive mechanism for the
protection and promotion of children’s rights at a regional level,
which is an innovation in the arena of children’s rights.176
The ACRWC stresses the need to consider African cultural
peculiarities in matters relating to the rights of children.177 Many
scholars have rightly observed that the ACRWC offers a higher level
of protection than that offered by the CRC.178 The ACRWC
recognizes children as direct bearers of rights who in turn bear

172. Id.
173. Id. at 6. Sloth-Nielsen commends such approaches as suitable for Africa
because they “overcome resource constraints that prevail in African context.” Id.
174. See Ann Skelton, Restoritive Justice in Child Justice Systems in Africa, in
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN AFRICA 129, 132-35 (Julia Sloth-Nielsen ed., 2008)
[hereinafter Skelton, Restorative Justice Systems in Africa] (explaining the
application of restorative justice models in Uganda, Ghana, and South Africa).
175. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 920 (2d ed. 2000).
176. Lloyd, The African Regional System, supra note 160, at 33.
177. See Sloth-Nielsen, Children’s Rights and the Law, supra note 129, at 23
(stating that the ACRWC was drafted due to the belief that the CRC did not
adequately address the unique socio-culural and economic situations in Africa).
178. See id. (acknowledging that the incorporation of African socio-economic
situations and cultural values into the African Charter provides more protection to
African nations than the CRC); see also Olowu, supra note 125, at 128 (noting that
the Charter includes African experiences when considering children’s rights).
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responsibilities to others.179 Its monitoring body, the African
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
(“ACERWC”), has an extensive mandate to ensure state parties
comply with their treaty obligations.180 The ACEWRC can receive
state reports, individual communications as well as conduct ad hoc
missions and onsite visits to states considered to be violating their
treaty obligations and it also has standing before the African Court of
Human and People’s Rights.181 The ACRWC, so far ratified by fortyfive out of the fifty-three African nations, is a combination of the
values of the CRC and the African historical and cultural values,
drafted due to the fact that some of the CRC provisions are vague
because the CRC had to satisfy the culturally diverse international
community involved in its drafting.182 The preamble to the ACRWC
reaffirms the proclamations of the 1979 Declaration and explicitly
recognizes that the child in Africa “occupies a unique and privileged
position in society.”183
The ACRWC’s juvenile justice provisions are similar to those in
the CRC and in certain respects the CRC provides for more
obligations than the Charter, such as the express provision on
diversion (Article 40(3)), which is not similarly included in the
ACRWC (Article 17).184 In Article 5, which provides for the inherent
right to life, the ACRWC prohibits the death penalty for crimes
committed by children,185 but is silent regarding its position on life
imprisonment.186 This omission is unfortunate because contemporary
human rights law establishes that life imprisonment without a

179. African Charter, supra note 110, art. 31.
180. This mandate extends further than that of the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child, which only has jurisdiction to receive and comment on state reports
submitted periodically.
181. Lloyd, The African Regional System, supra note 160 at 33.
182. Id. at 34-35.
183. African Charter, supra note 110, at pmbl.
184. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 3.
185. See African Charter, supra note 110, art. 5.; see also International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 6, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); Organization of American States, American Convention
on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
(entered into force July 18, 1978).
186. See African Charter, supra note 110, art. 5 (providing a right to life, but
lacking regulation regarding life imprisonment).
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possibility of release is unacceptable for children.187
Article 17 of the ACRWC incorporates a number of basic
principles on which a juvenile justice system should be based. A
child accused or found guilty of a crime is entitled to “special
treatment in a manner consistent with the child’s sense of dignity and
worth and which reinforces the child’s respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms of others.”188 Chirwa’s analysis of Article 17
is that it breaks new ground for the protection of children’s rights in
three respects.189 In the first place, it provides for the speedy
determination of matters involving children.190 Secondly, unlike the
CRC, Article 17(3) expressly and clearly provides that reformation
and re-integration of the child must be the essential aim of treatment
of the child during trial and after conviction. This strengthens the
contention that “rehabilitation is a right of every prisoner.”191
Thirdly, Article 17(2)(c)(iii) guarantees every child the right to be
afforded legal and other appropriate assistance in the preparation and
presentation of his defense.192 Again, as observed by Chirwa, “this
formulation is not qualified in any way and finds no comparison in
any other human rights instrument.”193 Another safeguard in Article
17 is that the press and the public are prohibited from the trial of a
child, although this has been described as a weakness for its effect of
preventing human rights violations from being exposed.194 However,
the strictness of the child’s privacy is more in the best interests of the
child than is the need for exposing human rights violations through
the media.195 Needless to say, the exposure of the violations can still
be achieved without the media necessarily being present at trial and
divulging the identity of the child. South Africa provides a good
example of ensuing the right to privacy regarding the identity of
187. See Chirwa, supra note 157, at 161-62 (noting that the Charter should
therefore have included a provision similar to article 37(a) of the CRC to protect
children from life imprisonment without a possibility of release).
188. African Charter, supra note 110, art. 17(1).
189. Chirwa, supra note 157, at 166.
190. See African Charter, supra note 110, art. 17(2)(c)(iv); see also Chirwa,
supra note 157, at 166 (suggesting that this “entails a pace that is over and above
that applicable to adults”).
191. Chirwa, supra note 157, at 166.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 167.
195. Id.
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child offenders as seen in the case of DPP KZN v. P,196 where a
twelve-year-old girl was convicted of her grandparent’s murder, but
her identity has remained private to date.197 Article 17 also provides
that children be “separated from adults in their place of detention or
imprisonment.”198 The importance of this provision cannot be
emphasized enough as it is a significant problem in Africa, as seen in
the case of Evance Moyo described at the beginning of this paper.
Amongst its weaknesses, the ACRWC does not provide for
alternative measures of dealing with children to criminal proceedings
nor does it say that imprisonment of the child must be used as a
measure of last resort and for the shortest period of time.199 It also
does not discuss the importance of protecting children from the
adverse effects of criminal proceedings and sanctions and it does not
reiterate all rights surrounding the administration of justice,
especially those in the ICCPR.200 For state parties that ratified the
ICCPR, perhaps the omission does not really have much effect on
them, as they are bound by the provisions of the ICCPR when it
comes to these rights.
Both the CRC and the African Children’s Charter impose two
general obligations on states: to adopt legislation and to formulate
and implement other measures to realize children’s rights.201 The
CRC is the primary instrument that guides the development of child
justice and it is “seen as the overarching framework for a child rights
approach.”202 According to the Committee, many States parties still
have a long way to go in achieving full compliance with the CRC
when it comes to child justice.203 Of concern are areas of procedural
196. Kwazulu-Natal v. P 2005 (363/2005) SA 1 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
197. Id.
198. African Charter, supra note 110, art. 17.
199. Chirwa, supra note 157, at 167.
200. For example, the right against self-incrimination and retrospective criminal
laws and punishment, and the right to be compensated for miscarriage of justice.
201. Danwood M. Chirwa & Thoko Kaime, Where Are the Missing Pieces?
Constructing a Mosaic of the CRC and the African Children’s Charter in Malawi’s
Law and Policy, 2 MALAWI L.J. 85, 86 (2008).
202. Julia Sloth-Nielson, The International Framework, in CHILD JUSTICE IN
AFRICA: A GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE 18, 18 (J. Sloth-Nielsen & J. Gallineti eds.,
2004), available at http://protection.unsudanig.org/ [hereinafter CHILD JUSTICE IN
AFRICA: A GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE].
203. C.R.C., Children’s Rights in Juveline Justice, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10
(Apr. 25, 2007).

2012]

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

571

rights, the development and implementation of alternative measures
to judicial proceedings, and the use of deprivation of liberty only as a
measure of last resort.204 The ACRWC, as the regional framework for
children’s rights, is more limited in scope than the CRC with regard
to child justice, but it contains provisions that pave the way for
restorative practices and policies in child justice. 205

IV.RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Many countries have been able to mandate the use of restorative
justice processes for significant proportions of juvenile justice.206 By
the mid-1990s, restorative justice had become popular in a number of
jurisdictions in the United States due to its focus on reparation of
harm, and the extent to which communities increase their capacity to
respond to crime and conflict, which offers a broader framework that
challenges the role of punishment and treatment as the primary
currencies of intervention.207 Zehr, one of the premier scholars of
restorative justice,208 identifies three basic principles that guide
restorative justice: (1) crime is a violation of people and of
interpersonal relationships, (2) violations create obligations, and (3)
the central obligation is to put right the wrongs.209
The restorative agenda provides a distinctive new standard for
gauging intervention success that has apparently been perceived as
neither soft on crime nor supportive of expanded punishment.210
While agreeing with advocates of rehabilitation and treatment in
affirming the need to actively respond to a range of problems that
204. Id.
205. See CHILD JUSTICE IN AFRICA: A GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE, supra note
202, at 25 (noting that the concepts of treatment and of restoring the child to his or
her family and society are important African values that help promote the best
practice of child justice).
206. See BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 74, at 7 (stating that countries
mandating the use of restorative justice processes require that “decision makers
provide reasons for not referring cases to restorative programs in writing.”).
207. Id. at 10.
208. Tina S. Ikpa, Note, Balancing Restorative Justice Principles and Due
Process Rights in Order to Reform the Criminal Justice System, 24 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 301, 301 (2007).
209. HOWARD ZEHR & ALI GOHAR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
19 (2003), available at www.justpeaceint.org/contents/msword%20files/
Restorative%20Justice.pdf.
210. BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 74, at 10.
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may be related to offending, restorative justice goes further to insist
that the complex problems of youth crime and deviant behavior
cannot be resolved by policies based on offender-driven services
alone.211 As such, restorative justice principles have implications for
redefining the role of boundaries of juvenile justice and providing a
new continuum for gauging the success of juvenile justice reform.212
Restorative justice views intervention as a community agenda to be
achieved through government and community action.213 Other
principles of restorative justice have been identified as healing,
participation, and government and community responsibility.214 In
the same vein, values of restorative justice are: amends, assistance,
collaboration, empowerment, encounter, inclusion, moral education,
protection, reintegration, and resolution.215 More than anything else,
the principles and values are consistent with dealing with children
and preparing them to be responsible citizens, bearing in mind that
they are still developing mentally.216
Restorative justice emphasizes recovery of the victim through
redress, vindication, and healing and recompense by the offender
through reparation, fair treatment and rehabilitation.217 Its methods
include encounter, victim-offender mediation, family group
conferencing, circles, and impact panels, and these are used in
diversion processes.218 In making amends, restorative justice uses
such elements as apology, changed behavior, restitution and
generosity.219 However, restorative justice has its critics.220 Due to the
fact that it is voluntary and non-punitive, restorative justice presents
211. Id. at 11.
212. Id.
213. See DANIEL W. VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS STRONG, RESTORING
JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 43-50 (3d ed. 2006)
(arguing that the needs of victims and the injuries of offenders must be addressed
and that communities and governments must take an active role in establishing
safety).
214. Id. at 43-46.
215. Id. at 49-50.
216. African Charter, supra note 110, at pmbl.
217. BAZEMORE & SCHIFF, supra note 74, at 57.
218. Bennett Burkemper & Nina Balsam, Examining the Use of Restorative
Justice Practices in Domestic Violence Cases, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 121,
123-25 (2007).
219. Id. at 85.
220. Ikpa, supra note 208, at 305.

2012]

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

573

problems with regard to due process rights in criminal justice, hence
there is a danger of human rights violations in the absence of set
standards and guidelines for restorative justice.221 This then calls for
a broader construct of rights in criminal justice to go beyond merely
due process rights. As noted by other scholars, “human rights such as
dignity and equality may be enhanced through acknowledging
responsibility in a restorative justice process . . . .”222
Garland has remarked that “rehabilitation programmes no longer
claim to express the overarching ideology of the [penal] system, nor
even to be the leading purpose of any penal measure.”223 This could
be because of the punitive nature of penal measures which in most
cases leave those in conflict with the law in a worse off position than
before. The United States was the leading state in the welfarist
approach, but it has “the less admirable record of having led the way
on increasingly retributive, tough-on-crime attitudes towards child
offenders.”224 In order to avoid the employment of retributive
standards on child offenders, many societies are shifting to
restorative justice as a model for child justice.225 This is seen as a
return to the traditional way of community care for children,226
wherein traditional ways were used to deal with the vast majority of
children in conflict with the law in a number of developing countries,
especially in Africa and South-East Asia. According to Skelton and
Sekhonyane, “a number of restorative justice writers have sought to
221. See Ann Skelton & Cheryl Frank, How Does Restorative Justice Address
Human Rights and Due Process Issues?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE 203, 203-13 (Howard Zehr & Barb Toews eds., 2004) (asserting that the
restorative justice process “requires the offender to acknowledge responsibility
before referral to a restorative justice program,” meaning that the offender is no
longer protected by a presumption of innocence and the right to remain silent).
222. Ann Skelton & Makubetse Sekhonyane, Human Rights and Restorative
Justice, IN HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 580, 591 (Gerry Johnstone &
Daniel W. Van Ness eds., 2007).
223. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 38 (citing D. GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF
CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 8 (2001)).
224. Skelton Thesis, supra note 31 .
225. See Skelton, Restorative Justice Systems in Africa, supra note 174, at 13239 (highlighting the application of restorative justice principles in various countries
including Namibia, Lesotho, Uganda, Ghana, and South Africa).
226. Gina Lucarelli, Good Practices in Juvenile Justice Beyond EAPRO,
UNICEF (2003) (presented at EAPRO Regional Review for Juvenile Justice) (on
file with Juvenile Justice Panel) available at http://www.juvenilejusticepanel.org
(last visited July 21, 2011).
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show that, although retributive crime control dominates in the West,
if we look back far enough in our collective history, we will find a
time when disputes belonged to the people and restitution was the
normal resort.”227 Thus, few cases were referred to the central justice
system and the major benefits of the traditional justice system
included the fact that children remained with their families and their
communities to ensure minor disruption to their lives. Skelton and
Sekhonyane further state that traditional justice systems are generally
restorative in nature and while they do not hold up to a critique of
due process rights protection expected from the criminal justice
system by western legal philosophy, “the processes are generally
protective and healing and aim at restoring harmony in society.” 228
This was ably discussed at the 254th meeting of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child, where it was said that the traditional justice
system included such components as the restoration of equilibrium in
the community, forgiveness and reconciliation.229 It was agreed at
the same meeting that restorative justice might be a good paradigm
for giving life to the standards set out in the international
instruments, because of the emphasis placed on reconciliation, rest
and healing, on participation by the young person, family and
community, and on the spirit of ubuntu or the community
approach.230 Referring to arguments about the risks involved in
traditional systems, it was said that customary law was a living
system that could be broadened to take new standards into
consideration.231 There were, however, challenges involved in
integrating traditional systems: informal justice methods must
include due process; a community-based, individualized approach
must also achieve equality and efforts should aim at ensuring that
culture and custom did not clash with the CRC.232 It was highlighted
that what was in the best interests of the child was in the best
interests of society, hence a juvenile justice system that did not
function well failed not only the children, but society as a whole, for,
far from protecting society, it merely generated criminals to prey

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Skelton & Sekhonyane, supra note 222, at 580.
Id. at 587.
C.R.C., supra note 19, ¶¶ 11-12.
Id. ¶ 24.
Id.
Id.

2012]

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

575

upon it. This 254th meeting of the Committee of the Rights of the
Child in 1995 offers a groundbreaking discussion of the use of
restorative justice in child justice at the international level. It is
therefore appropriate to explore the development of restorative
justice in international instruments at this point.
As noted by Smith, the Vienna Declaration, published in the year
2000 after the tenth UN Congress, is a milestone for restorative
justice within UN paradigms.233 Preparatory UN congress reports
noted “that the concept of restorative justice should be a fundamental
element of discussions of accountability and fairness to offenders
and victims in the justice process.”234 “The philosophy behind
restorative justice was to manage the harm done and to restore the
offender and victim to their former state as far as possible.”235
“Restorative justice presented the criminal justice process with an
alternative to the established modes of trial and punishment and
sought to include the community and society as a whole in the
restorative process.”236 It was also noted in the preparatory reports
that, in recent years, “restorative justice had attracted the interest of
policy makers, practitioners, researchers and individual actors in the
criminal justice process.”237 Restorative justice “as an ancient
practice was largely used for young offenders and less serious
offences that had re-emerged in new forms such as mediation, family
group conferencing and healing circles.”238 The participants
discussed possible applications of restorative justice in cases
involving adult offenders and more serious crimes.239
In 2009, Resolution 10/2 on “Human Rights in the Administration
of Justice, in Particular Juvenile Justice”240 was adopted by the UN
Human Rights Council (“UNHRC”), which is the most recent
233. Melodee A. Smith, Restorative Justice is a Human Right: A Transformative
Discourse Within UN Paradigms 4 (Apr. 20, 2005) (working paper) (presented to
the Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice),
available at http://www.pfi.org/cjr/about-cjr/un-initiatives/11thcongress/other/
humanright/view.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. UNHRC, supra note 17, at 1.
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international resolution dealing with child justice.241 The Resolution
states in paragraph 7 that “the Council recognizes that every child
and juvenile in conflict with the law must be treated in a manner
consistent with his or her rights, dignity and needs, in accordance
with international law, and relevant international standards on human
rights in the administration of justice, and calls on state parties to the
CRC to abide strictly by its principles and provisions and to improve
the status of information on the situation of juvenile justice.”242 Thus,
the UNHRC underscores the importance of rights-based systems of
justice for children in conflict with the law and Gallinetti applauds
this as a significant development because it reaffirms the UN
approach to children in conflict with the law as clearly provided for
in the CRC, and also links child justice with the importance of the
administration of justice generally, which falls under the purview of
the UNHRC.243 Most significantly, the Resolution further encourages
states to use of alternative measures, such as diversion and
restorative justice and to ensure the principle that detention of
children should be a measure of last resort and for the shortest
appropriate period of time.244 Furthermore, states are urged to include
rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for former child offenders
in juvenile justice policies, and “that under their legislation and
practices, neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without
the possibility of release is imposed for offences committed by
persons below eighteen years of age.”245
As such, as Gallinetti says, in line with the approach of UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child, “the UNHRC emphasizes two
key elements of an effective child justice system, namely, the use of
alternative dispositions to the formal criminal justice system, and the
avoidance of detention of children unless as a last resort and for the
shortest appropriate time.”246 Accordingly, the UNHRC “should be
commended for its decisive stance on child justice and for
identifying the critical issues that pose challenges for criminal justice
241. The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS PROJECT, 6 (Aug.
2009), available at http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-projects/childrensrights/article-40/archives/Art11_2.pdf/.
242. UNHRC, supra note 17, at ¶ 7.
243. Id. at 6-8.
244. UNHRC, supra note 17, at ¶ 9.
245. Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
246. The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008, supra note 241, at 8.
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systems across the world.”247 The resolution is an important addition
to “international jurisprudence on children in the criminal justice
system, and is welcomed as another clear statement on the need for
domestic compliance with international norms and standards, as well
as the proper implementation thereof.” 248
Smith chronicles the growing interest and increased attention
given to restorative justice constructs in UN paradigms249 and
propounds that a transformative discourse is emerging that
recognizes restorative justice as a human right.250 Restorative justice,
“no longer spoken of as a possible fad or passing trend, is widely
recognized in a variety of ways and in many contexts by most
member states and the international community.”251 Principles of
criminal justice and human rights collide as adversarial systems seek
retribution. In agreeing with Smith, “while the criminal justice
system focuses on broken laws, who is guilty and how the guilty
should be punished, the UN is in the embryonic stages of embracing
a restorative justice paradigm that focuses on broken relationships,
who is in need and how well-being and social harmony may be
restored.”252 “Restorative justice, and not just justice designed to
punish, is being recognized as an emerging human right for victims,
offenders and the community.”253 It is a viable response to human
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Smith, supra note 233, at 1-6. As seen in documents such as the draft
discussion guide for regional preparatory meetings published in 1998; the 1999
draft resolution for the administration of juvenile justice; the 1999 draft resolution
on the development and implementation of mediation and restorative justice
measures; the 2001 Reports of preparatory meetings and activities at the
international, regional and national levels; the 2004 Discussion Guide for the 11th
UN Congress (Workshop 2 was titled “Enhancing Criminal Justice Reform,
Including Restorative Justice”); and the Draft Salvador Declaration. The U.N.
Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice also recognizes the importance
of preventing youth crime, supporting the rehabilitation of young offenders and
their reintegration into society, and recommends “the broader application, as
appropriate, of alternatives to imprisonment, restorative justice and other relevant
measures that foster the diversion of young offenders from the criminal justice
system.” See U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Draft
Salvador Declaration on Comprehensive Strategies for Global Challenges, ¶¶ 2021, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.213/L.6/Rev.1 (Apr. 16, 2010).
250. Smith, supra note 233, at 2.
251. Id. at 6.
252. Id. at 2.
253. Id. at 2.
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rights violations and inadequate justice systems. In preparation for
the 10th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment
of Offenders, the Secretary-General reported that “paradigm shifts
within all facets of the criminal justice system needed to be
addressed.” 254 “Restorative justice might be a good paradigm for
giving life to the standards set out in the international instruments
because of the emphasis placed on reconciliation, rest and healing,
on participation by the young person, family and community, and on
the spirit of ubuntu or the community approach.”255 The Preamble to
the Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in
Criminal Matters256 recalls that there has been “worldwide, a
significant growth of restorative justice initiatives” and emphasizes
that that “restorative justice is an evolving response to crime that
respects the dignity and equality of each person, builds
understanding, and promotes social harmony through the healing of
victims, offenders and communities.” The preamble also recognizes
that that this restorative justice “provides an opportunity for victims
to obtain reparation, feel safer and seek closure; allows offenders to
gain insight into the causes and effects of their behaviour and to take
responsibility in a meaningful way; and enables communities to
understand the underlying causes of crime, to promote community
well-being and to prevent crime.”257 However, the “retributive
process that has traditionally focused on the offender and the State is
seen as archaic and still too rarely resorts to non-custodial sanctions
or other alternatives, including restorative justice.”258 Significantly,
“the UN documents recognize a need to restore well-being and social
harmony in the community.”259 When restorative justice is
recognized as a human right, access to justice for victims, offenders
and members of the community enhances the prospects for a justice
that heals and a peace that endures.260

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 3.
C.R.C., supra note 19, at ¶ 24.
E.S.C. Res. 2002/12, at pmbl., U.N. Doc. E/RES/2002/12 (Aug. 13, 2002).
Id. at pmbl.
Smith, supra note 233, at 6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 2.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is clear that children, as a vulnerable group of
society, have their rights curtailed from time to time, and children in
conflict with the law experience this to a much greater extent,
particularly children in Africa. In providing safeguards for children
in conflict with the law, two important and progressive instruments,
the CRC and the ACRWC, have crystallized human rights for
children and provide for the administration of child justice. Child
justice is a field that has undergone several theoretical shifts since
the end of the nineteenth century. There has been a shift from an
initial welfarist model of child justice to a justice model and then a
children’s rights mode, and now the theory of restorative justice is at
the helm of the child justice jurisprudential development, as
evidenced by its incorporation in several UN documents. It is herein
submitted that restorative justice is the best approach for dealing with
children in conflict with the law because of its emphasis on
reparation of harm, as children are better placed to be reformed than
adults. Restorative justice has therefore become a model of child
justice.

